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PANEL I: CONCLUDING REMARKS
PAUL R. DIMOND
n UR next panel will explore the limits of Brown in the 1970s and
1980s, particularly in the area of segregation and education law. In
evaluating the transforming power of Brown discussed by the first panel,
let us first consider the nature of the basic choices made by courts.
The choices that a court makes in arriving at its constitutional deci-
sions have great and long-standing consequences. For example, in Plessy
v. Ferguson,2 the Supreme Court chose to adopt the premise that segrega-
tion of the races did not stamp Blacks with a badge of inferiority.3 Con-
sequently, a spate of Jim Crow laws were enacted by state legislatures4
and a regime of racial subjugation under the law ensued for generations.
Plessy, however, had its own limits. Within its limits, of course, was the
erroneous premise that state-enforced segregation did not impose a caste
label of subjugation on Blacks, a veritable mark of inferiority on the fore-
head of every African-American.
In focusing on the fate of Plessy in Brown I, the Warren Court finally
chose to reject this segregation standard. In an infrequently quoted, and
probably less-remembered line, the Warren Court cited the district court
finding that segregation is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the Negro race, and held that "[a]ny language in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected."5
In Brown I and Brown II, however, there is, at best, an opaque stan-
dard for the actual constitutional violation. It is not entirely clear
whether it is a type of suspect classification, as in Bolling v. Sharpe,6
where, in essence, the Court stated that there was no rational reason for
separating children on the basis of race in schools.7 In fact, Brown I
hints that an anti-caste principle should guide the jurisprudence of the
courts in future years.' In Brown II, there is again a hint of a massive
constitutional violation. Recognition that an entire system of segregated
schooling was at stake, however, is the reason given for the delay in the
admission of the named plaintiffs to otherwise Whites-only schools.9
Moreover, for the next fourteen years the Court steadfastly refused to
1. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. See id. at 550-51.
4. See Paul R. Dimond, The Supreme Court and Judicial Choice 31-59, 105-17
(1989); Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard
for Review of Race Cases, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1983).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (Brown 1).
6. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
7. See id. at 499-500.
8. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
9. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown 11).
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